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INTRODUCTION

The Council of the European Communities passed the Council
Directive on the Coordinationof CertainProvisionsLaid Down by
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television BroadcastingActivities,1 popularly known as Television Without Frontiers, on October 3, 1989.
The Directive has become a center of controversy due to its impact
upon the trade of television programs, especially American, in the
European Television Market. The debate over the Directive has
taken the form of both economic and political arguments, as well
as basic statements of legal positions. 2 Commentators have summarized these positions and made comparisons to other international attempts at broadcast regulation. 3 However, to date no indepth legal analysis has evaluated the substance of the positions
adopted by the parties directly affected by the Directive.
This Article assumes the perspective of legal counsel to the
United States. It explores bodies of international law that are
available as a basis for constructing a response to the Directive.
Part II of this article briefly explores the European Community
[hereinafter EC] goal of offering an integrated Europe as conceptualized in the Single European Act. 4 Part III describes the Directive, paying particular attention to the quota provision for non-EC
works contained in Article 4 of the Directive, and the definition of
European Works. Part IV examines the context for the enactment
of the Directive. It traces the roots of Article 4, the history of European broadcasting legislation, and the debate surrounding the
Directive. Part V analyzes the international financial stakes in the
regulation of television broadcasting. Part VI proposes the first of
three possible United States responses to the Directive. Part VII
examines the argument that the Directive is a violation of the
OCED Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations. Part
VIII examines the argument that the Directive is a violation of the
international doctrine of the free flow of information. Finally, Part
IX describes the repercussions of allowing the Directive to violate
1. Council Directive No. 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 [hereinafter Directive].
2. Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the International"Free Flow" of Information, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 372 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Single European Act, BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. No. 2/86.
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principles of free trade and the doctrine of the free flow of
information.
II.

THE EC

GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED EUROPE

The Directive, which regulates television broadcasting, is one5
twelve directives enacted by the European Commission
over
of
designed to remove trade barriers and liberalize regulations between member states .within the EC.
The EC enacted these directives as part of an overall plan to
accelerate the formation of a barrier-free Europe. The Single European Act of 1986, gave the EC a self-imposed deadline of December 31, 1992, to create a single European Market which is free of
all trade barriers between member countries." In an effort to
achieve this goal, the Council of Ministers1 adopted the above
mentioned directives, covering a wide variety of areas including
banking, investments, securities, intellectual property, and television broadcasting.'

III.
A.

THE DIRECTIVE DESCRIBED

The Broadcast Directive as a Whole: Salient Features

The Directive regulates European Broadcasting through two
methods. First, it introduces measures which increase the free flow
of broadcast material within Europe and eliminates individual
member state regulation that "'impedes the free movement of
broadcasts within the Community and may distort competition
within the common market."9 Second, the Directive imposes limi5. The European Commission is the administrative body of the EC and is responsible
for implementing the 1992 Program. It has seventeen members: two from France, Italy,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany; and one from each of
the other member states. Fred H. Cate, The European Broadcasting Directive, Apr. 1990
A.B.A. SEC. INT'L. L. & PRAC., at 1, n.4.
6. The objective was to create a single market in which "the free movement of goods,
persons, services, and capital is ensured." See 298 U.S.T. 11, 17, supplemented by the Single
European Act 1986; the EC Commission White Paper of 1985, Completing the European
Market.
7. The council is composed of the ministers from each Member State, with each Member State having between two and ten votes, depending upon the country's size. The council
of Ministers may accept or reject, but not modify, measures proposed by the commission.
Cate, supra note 5, at 1, n.5.
8. Id.
9. Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl. 13-1.
Whereas the laws, regulations and administrative measures in Member States
concerning the pursuit of activities as television broadcasters and cable operators contain disparities, some of which may impede the free movement of broad-
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tations upon the type of material which may be broadcast in the
community and how it may be presented. 10 It regulates the content
and quantity of advertising and the content of programming to
protect minors and assure moral suitability." Additionally, it guarantees a right of reply to persons injured by factually incorrect
broadcasts.' 2 It requires that a majority of the programming be devoted to "European Works," and that at least ten percent be reserved for European Works created by producers who are independent of broadcasters. 13 It also regulates the means by which
broadcast material may be presented, 4 the placement of advertising within programs, 15 and requires the clear identification of programming sponsors."
For purposes of this discussion, Article 4 is the most significant Directive provision. It requires that:
1. Member States shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European Works,
within the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of their
transmission time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports
events, games, advertising and teletext services. This proportion,
having regard to the broadcaster's informational, educational,
cultural and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public,
should be achieved progressively, on the basis of suitable
criteria.1"
The basic point of Article 4 is to require that European Broadcasters devote a majority of their transmission time to "European
Works" excluding time appointed to news, sports events, games,
advertising, and teletext services.
casts within the Community and may distort competition within the common
market;
Whereas all such restrictions on freedom to provide broadcast services within
the Community must be abolished under the Treaty; ....

Id.
In conjunction with this statement of purpose to abolish unnecessary restrictions on the
movement of broadcast services, the Directive creates the principle that "[m]ember states
shall ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict retransmission on their territory of
television broadcasts from other Member States for reasons which fall within the fields coordinated by this Directive." Id. at art. 2(2).
10. Id. at ch. 2.
11. Id. at ch. 5.
12. Id. at ch. 6.
13. Id. at art. 5.
14. Id. at art. 4.
15. Id. at art. 11.
16. Id. at art. 17.
17. Id. at art. 4.
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B.

The Definition of "European Works"

A "European Work" is not defined by the content of the work,
but rather by the identity of the producer, the talent involved in
the production, and the location of the production."8 American
programs such as Charles in Charge, LA Law, or Dallas could all
have been "European Works" had they been made by European
producers and talent in European Countries. The fact that they
contain no European themes and reflect only American culture has
no impact upon their qualification as "European Works" under the
Directive."9
20
"European Works" are broken down into several categories.
The first category of programming may be referred to as Community Works. Community Works must meet three requirements.
Id. at art. 6
Id. at ch. 3.
Article 6 of the Directive defines "European Work" as follows:
Within the meaning of this chapter, 'European Works' means the following:
(a) works originating from Member States of the Community and, as
regards television broadcasters falling within the jurisdiction of the
Federal Republic of Germany, works from German territories where
the Basic Law does not apply and fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 2;
(b) works originating from'European third States party to the European Convention on Transfrontier Television of the Council of Europe and fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 2;
(c) works originating from other European third countries and fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 3.
2. The works referred to in paragraph 1(a) and (b) are works mainly made with
authors and workers residing in one or more States referred to in paragraph 1
(a) and (b) provided that they comply with one of the following three conditions:
(a) they are made by one or more producers established in one or
more of those States; or
(b) production of the works is supervised and actually controlled by
one or more producers established in one or more of those States; or
(c) the contribution of co-producers of those States to the total coproduction costs is preponderant and the co-production is not controlled by one or more producers established outside those States.
3. The works referred to in paragraph 1 (c) are works made exclusively or in coproduction with producers established in one or more Member State [sic] by
producers established in one or more European third countries with which the
Community will conclude agreements in accordance with the procedures of the
Treaty, if those works are mainly made with authors or workers residing in one
or more European States.
4. Works which are not European works within the meaning of paragraph 1, but
made mainly with authors and workers residing in one or more Member States,
shall be considered to be European works to an extent corresponding to the proportion of the contribution of Community co-producers to the total production
costs.

18.
19.
20.
1.
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First, they must originate from a member state of the EC.21 Second, they must be works "mainly made with authors and workers
residing in" one or more Member State of the Community.2 2
Third, they must meet one of three requirements: (1) they must be
made by one or more producers established in one or more EC
states, or (2) their production must have been supervised and actually controlled by one or more producers established in one or
more EC states, or (3) the contribution of co-producers of EC
states to the total co-production costs must be preponderant and
the co-production must not be controlled by one or more producers
established outside EC states.2
The second European Works category may be called "European Convention Party Works." Such works must meet requirements similar to those for Community Works. They must originate
from European Third States party to the European Convention on
Transfrontier Television of the Council of Europe.2 4 They must
have been created predominantly by authors and workers residing
in at least one of those states. 5 In addition, they must meet one of
the following three requirements: (1) they must be made "by one
or more producers established in one or more of those States; 2 6 or
(2) their production must have been "supervised and actually controlled by one or more producers established in one or more those
States;"2 7 or (3) "the contribution of co-producers of those States
to the total co-production costs must be preponderant and the coproduction must not be controlled by one or more producers estab'2
lished outside those States.
Works referred to as European Third Country Works comprise the third category. These works must originate from European Third Countries which either were not EC members or a
party to the European Convention on Transfrontier Television of
the Council of Europe. 29 Additionally, they must be "made exclusively or in co-production with producers established in one or
more [EC] State [sic] by producers established in one or more European third countries with which the Community will conclude
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

6(1)(a).
6(2).
6(2)(a)-(c).
6(1)(b).
6(2).

at art. 6(2)(a)-(c).
at art. 6(1)(c).
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agreements in accordance with procedures of the Treaty [of
Rome]." 30 Finally, the works must be made mainly by "authors
and workers residing in one or more European States."3 '
A final category may be referred to as Partial European
Works. This category applies to works "made mainly with authors
and workers residing in one or more [EC] States," but which still
fail to qualify as European Works under the previously mentioned
categories.32 Such a work can be considered a Partial European
work to the extent corresponding to the "proportion of the contribution of Community co-producers to the total production costs."3 3
The Scope of Article 4: The Majority Requirement

C.

Although Article 4 generally requires that member countries
ensure broadcasters reserve a majority proportion of their broadcast time for "European Works," member states are exempted
where attaining such a majority proportion is not practicable.3 4 A
member state must meet two conditions to be exempt. First, it
must maintain an average proportion of European works not lower
than the average for 1988 in the Member State concerned. 5 Second, every two years the state must provide the Commission of the
European Communities with a report that includes a statistical
statement on the achievement of the Article 4 proportion and an
explanation for failire to attain that proportion.3 6 The Commission must inform other Member States and the European Parliament of the reports and submit an accompanying opinion concerning the progress of Member States' compliance with the Directive.
In making these progress reports the Commission can consider the
progress achieved in relation to previous years, the particular circumstances of new television broadcasters, the specific situation of
countries with a low audiovisual production capacity,37 and the
share of first broadcast works in the programming.3 8
30. Id. at art. 6.
31.

Id. at art. 6(3).

32.

Id. at art. 6(4).

33.

Id.

34.

Id. at art. 4(1).

35.

Id. at art. 4(2).

36.

Id. at art. 4(3).

37.

Id.

38. Id.
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THE CONTEXT FOR THE ENACTMENT OF "TELEVISION WITHOUT
FRONTIERS"

A.

The Roots of Article 4

Experts who work with producers attempting to qualify their
entertainment products as "European Works" believe that the Directive's structure was taken from an older "grant system." In the
"grant system," benefactor countries awarded grants to producers
who created products which furthered cultural or economic goals
of the awarding country. 9 Producers received funds based on how
well their product met criteria established by benefactor countries.4 0 "Grant system" countries used economic subsidies to bolster their film industry and encourage films of national cultural
significance, whereas, the Directive uses a negative regulatory
scheme to exclude material which does not further its analogous
goals.
A present-day example of the grant system is the Canadian
Feature Film Fund created in 1986, to promote the production and
41
theatrical distribution of high quality Canadian dramatic films.
The criteria which the Fund uses to award grant money is similar
to the Directive's requirements for a product constituting a European Work. 4' To be eligible for grants from the Fund "production,
distribution, and sales companies must be under Canadian ownership and control. ' 43 This requirement resembles the Directives requirements which must be met to constitute European Works; that
producers of either European Convention or EC states control and
supervise the production of the audiovisual product.44 The Fund
also gives priority funding to productions which use Canadian "talent and technicians."4 5 This also resembles the Directive's requirements for works to qualify as European Works: that the works be
made mainly with authors and workers residing in either European
Convention or EC states. 46 However, the Fund criteria differs from
the Directive's requirements. The Fund gives priority,
39. Telephone Interview with Kathy Goodman & James Primm, Associates, Entertainment Department, White and Case, Los Angeles, California (Jan. 8, 1991).
40. Id.
41. See TELEFILM CANADA, FeatureFilm Fund-Policies1989-1990 (1989) [hereinafter
Fund].
42. Id. at pt. 2(3).
43. Id.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
45. Fund, supra note 41, at pt. 2(1).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
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to productions which have the highest proportion of Canadian
creative elements, Canadian stories, themes, talent and technicians. The Corporation [The Fund] does not intend to restrict
filmmakers in their choice of subjects but will favour [sic]
projects that present a distinctly Canadian point of view or set
in a clearly Canadian context.4 7
Therefore, the Fund, unlike the Directive, seeks Canadian
content or themes from the producers whom it supports. It is interesting to note that the Directive does not such have a content or
"theme" requirement given that its supposed purpose is to ensure
that European broadcasting become more culturally European. 48
B.

The History of European Broadcasting Legislation
1. Conceptualizing "Television Without Frontiers"

The concept of "Television Without Frontiers" was formally
introduced as an alternative to the old European regulatory
scheme in a European Commission report entitled The Green Paper on the Establishment Of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable.49
The old European broadcast scheme consisted of a myriad of
state centered regulations." States had in place idiosyncratic rules
requiring varying amounts of television of national or EC origin.
Some states were quite severe in their television regulation. Britain, for example, required that its television stations cumulatively
show "a reasonable proportion" of European programs. 51 As of
1989, the government's interpretation of "reasonable" was eightysix percent. This figure included news, sports, and quiz shows. 2 As
a result of negotiations with labor unions, Britain required that no
more than fourteen percent of a broadcaster's programming could
be produced outside England. 53 Television stations in France were
47. Fund, supra note 41, at pt. 2(1)(a).
48. Paul Presburger & Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity
and Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L. &
COMP. L. REv.495, 504 (1990). Note that the directive's lack of a "content" requirement is
an issue which will be discussed throughout this Article. It bears on whether the purpose of
the Directive is cultural or economic. Id.
49. COM (84) 300 final (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter Green Paper].
50. Laurel Wentz, EC Considers TV Restrictions, ADvERTIsING AGE, Nov. 3, 1986, at
69.
51. Buddy, can you spare a reel?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 1989, at 56.
52. Id.
53. Communications Policy Advisory Group Urges Single U.S. Representative to EC
on 1992, 6 INT'L. TRAiE REP. 958 (July 19, 1989) [hereinafter Advisory Group Urges].
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barred from broadcasting more than 192 movies per year; only
forty percent of which could be produced in non-EC countries. 5
This resulted in a limitation per French television station of seventy-six U.S. films per year, irrespective of the size of the station.5
France required that at least fifty percent of its entertainment programming be French produced. 56 News, sports, variety shows, game
shows, and talk shows did not qualify for meeting the quota of
French or EC-produced shows despite the fact that these "nonfiction" shows were mainly of French origin. Consequently, the
portion of the total broadcasting time available for non-EC programming was closer to thirty percent. 7 France put teeth into its
regulations by imposing a $10,000 fine on its broadcasters for each
hour they violated the quotas. 8 The threatened fines resulted in
the cancellation of several multi-million dollar agreements which
French television stations had with U.S. studios.5 9
Other European countries have instituted their own broadcast
regulations. Spain limited non-EC production of its three private
stations to forty-five percent."' Holland restricted advertisements
on foreign programs specifically aimed at the Dutch public.6 ' Itay
limited non-EC programming to sixty percent of total programming, but essentially ignored the quota.6 2 In contrast, Denmark,
Greece,63 and Germany,6 4 had little or no regulation.
The Green Paper recommended changing this patchwork of
nationally based broadcast regulation. First, it provided an overview of the existing technical and legal framework of broadcasting
regulation within the member states.6 5 Then, it then argued that
enhancing inter-European transmissions would be a "source of cul54. Television Broadcasting and the European Community: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications & Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1989) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Richard
Frank, President, Walt Disney Studios).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. These restrictions prevent foreign program distributors from carrying advertisements in Dutch, giving prices in Dutch currency, giving addresses of commercial outlets in
Holland or featuring products only available in the Netherlands. Raymond Snoddy, Television Without Frontiers Meets Dutch Resistance, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1985, § I, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Paul Anastasi, Greece Opens the Way to Private TV, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 1989, at
D19.
64. House Hearings, supra note 54.
65. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 48, at 496.
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tural enrichment." 6 It would create a momentum for technological
innovation in the European media 67 and would halt American
dominance of the media industry.6 "
2.

The Process of Legislating "Television Without Frontiers"

The birth of the Directive was a multi-stage process. In January of 1988 the European Parliament voted in favor of a European
"Television without Frontiers" by a 328-11 margin. However, the
Parliament had no power to enforce its decision.7 0 When the plan
went to the Council it ran into trouble when six of the twelve
member countries refused to accept it at a meeting in Luxembourg. 71 France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the former West Germany objected to the insertion of the concept that
only "where practicable" would the Directive require member
states to have a majority proportion of European Works.7 2 France
and Belgium wanted strict quotas imposed on U.S. made programs. The Commission, the executive body responsible for enforcing community law, felt that quotas of any kind violated the basic
principle of the free movement of goods and services enunciated in
the EC's founding treaty.73 Britain and West Germany questioned
the rules on the grounds that they encroached on their national
responsibilities.7 4 They and other EC countries objected because
they did not believe that the EC's authority included the power to
regulate cultural affairs. 5
In response to this apparent deadlock, the European Commission initiated legal action against France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands "over restrictions proteting their national television
channels from cross-border broadcast[ing]," European Commission
officials said.76 However, officials of the European Commission ac66. Green Paper,supra note 49, at 30; see also Presburger & Tyler, supra note 48, at
496-97.
67. Green Paper, supra note 49, at 53; see also Presburger & Tyler, supra note 48.
68. Green Paper,supra note 49, at 33; see also Presburger & Tyler, supra note 48, at
497.
69. European Parliament Votes for Europe-Wide Television, REUTERS, Jan. 20, 1988
(AM cycle).
70. Id.
71. European T.V. Plan Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1989, at D2.
72. EC Attacks French, Dutch, and Belgian TV Restrictions,REUTERS, July 19, 1989
(AM cycle) [hereinafter EC Attacks].
73. Id.
74. Buddy, can you spare a reel?, supra note 51.
75. Id.
76. EC Attacks, supra note 72.
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knowledged that the underlying purpose of the lawsuit was to
make a political statement and illustrate how badly uniform EC
broadcast regulation was needed. 77
The Directive was enacted with the "where practicable" wording in place. France succumbed to pressure from West Germany,
Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark to moderate its proposal. 78
Even with the moderation, the final vote was not unanimous, with
two of the twelve nations voting against it. 79 It is hypothesized that
some smaller countries did not support the quotas because it was
cheaper for broadcasters in those nations to buy American shows
than to produce them themselves.
C.

The U.S. Response

The U.S. government, U.S. industry, and European television
entrepreneurs strongly opposed the Directive as passed by the European Parliament." Initially, U.S. industry conducted strong public and private anti-Directive lobbying at the highest levels of European Government.8 1 However such efforts failed to produce
results. 82 The U.S. government and industry argued that the failure was due to the lack of access to the EC's legislative process.8 "
The United States House of Representatives, denounced the
Directive, calling it a trade restriction and declaring it to be in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 4 The
House Resolution requested that the United States take retaliatory
action.8 5 In Congress, Representative Bill Richardson (D-N.M.)
77.
78.
tionism,
79.

Id.
Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise; US. Officials Fear ProtecN.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al.
Id.
80. Fred Hift, TV Trade War Heats Up, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 2, 1989, at

10.
81. David Webster, The Phony War: European TV Quotas & American Excitement,
(Remarks by David Webster to the Mid-Atlantic Club at the Carnegie Endowment for Int'l
Peace) (D.C. Nov. 9, 1989).
82. Europe Adopts TV Plan Opposed by US, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 6,
1989, at 3.
83. U.S. DisappointedBy TV Directive, USTR Task Force Report on EC 1992 Says,
7 INT'L. TRADE REP. 809, June 6, 1990.
84. 135 CONG. REC. H7, 326-27 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989) (referencing General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S.)
[hereinafter GATT].
85. House Resolution 257 urged that "the President and the United States Trade Representative take all appropriate and feasible action under its authority, including possible
action under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, to protect and maintain United State's
access to the EC broadcasting market." CONG. REc., supra note 83, at 327.
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threatened to introduce legislation banning the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting from buying BBC and other European
programming."'
In the international arena the United States formally challenged Article 4 of the Directive in the presence of the ruling council of GATT.8 7 The EC responded by saying that it did not believe
that GATT was the correct forum for the dispute.88 However, nonEC countries agreed to discuss the subject. 9
After the initial flurry of opposition to the Directive, U.S. government and industry took a more "low-key" approach. They
"put[] mild, but constant pressure on the EC in GATT, and
push[ed] for the subject of services to be negotiated at the Uruguay rounds, but [did] not provok[e] any major confrontations
with the EC." 9 However, the U.S. government is presently considering taking France to GATT over the "French Decree," 91 which
requires French broadcasters to devote at least sixty percent of
their programming time to European Works and fifty percent to
92
French material.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STAKES IN THE REGULATION OF

V.

ENTERTAINMENT BROADCASTING

The ramifications of non-EC broadcasting quotas can be understood by analyzing the European market for television.
A.

The Magnitude of the U.S. Industry Stake

American entertainment products are the second biggest U.S.
export.9 3 As of 1989, over $1 billion worth of American films and
television programs were shown on European television stations.94
Statistics show that U.S. exports of films for European television
are rapidly increasing. The total U.S. film industry sales in Europe,
including receipts from box office, television, and video sales were
86. Cate, supra note 2, at 411; see also Hubbub Intensifies; Congress Lashes Out at
European TV Content Restrictions, 9 COMM. DAILY 1, Oct. 13, 1989.
87. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 48, at 506.
88. Laura Raun, A Dramatic Change on the Media Landscape, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 19,
1989, at 6.
89. Id.
90. Interview with U.S. government officials who wish to remain anonymous.
91. Journal Officiel De La Republique Francaise,18 JANVIER 1990, at 757.
92. Id.
93. Id. Defense material is the biggest U.S. export. Id.
94. Buddy, can you spare a reel?, supra note 51.
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$2.5 billion in 1987, and approximately $3 billion in 1988. 91 By
1989 they were five times what they were in 1983.96
Additionally, the European market is also the largest source of
television sales outside the United States. As of 1989, two-thirds of
major studio television sales outside the United States were in EC
countries,9" amounting to approximately $630 million. In contrast,
1980 sales amounted to only $100 million.9 8 Further, anecdotal evidence9 9 presents Eastern Europe as a potentially lucrative market
for American film and television.
Japan and Australia also have an interest in the European television market. After American imports, Japanese cartoons are one
of the largest imports for European television stations. 100
B. Defining U.S. and Other Non-E.C. Market Share of European Broadcasting and Determining the Likely Impact of the
Directive
Financial sources conflict as to the exact percentage of the European television market that the American industry now holds.
However, most sources agree that seventy percent of fiction programs shown in the Community are foreign created. 10 1 The estimations of what quantity of the non-EC material is of U.S. origin varies between fifty percent and forty percent. The fifty percent figure
indicates a thirty-five percent U.S. share of the total European
Market [hereinafter T.E.M.] for fiction,0 2 with the forty percent
95. Advisory Group Urges, supra note 53.
96. Buddy, can you spare a reel?, supra note 51.
97. Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. Fights Europe TV-Show Quota, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1989, at D1.
98. Id.
99. See Colin McIntyre, East Bloc Rush for "Television Without Frontiers,"
REUTERS, May 12, 1989 (BC cycle).
100. General Developments: GATT, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. No. 41, 1346, Oct. 18, 1989.
101. Yves Clarisse, EC Puts Finishing Touches to Television Without Frontiers,
REUTERS, Mar. 12, 1989 (BC cycle); Leyla Ertugrul, EC Agrees Rules For "TV Without
Frontiers," REUTERS, Mar. 14, 1989 (PM cycle). However, there are other sources which
seem to disagree with this number. France, for instance, commissioned a survey which it
submitted to the EC in 1988. The survey indicated that based on the criteria set out in the
Television Without Frontiers draft directive European content in the broadcasts of all television channels available in the Community averaged 68%. Jane K. Albrecht, Director, European Home Video and Pay Television, Request of the Motion PictureExport Association
of America, Inc. for Designation of the European Community as a "Priority Country"
Under Section 182 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Feb. 15, 1991
[hereinafter Request of the MPEAA], at 20 (citing Summary of "European Programme
Content in the Broadcasts of European Television Channels in 1988", BIPE, Sept. 1989)).
102. See Clarisse, supra note 101; Ertugrul, supra note 101; L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1989,
pt. 6, at 2.
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figure indicating a twenty eight percent U.S. share of T.E.M."'0 In
contrast, the Europeans have a less than two percent share of the
U.S. market. 04
The Europeans claim that the figures indicate that the American entertainment industry will not be negatively affected by the
Directive. The rationale is that the United States has, at most,
only thirty-five percent of the EC television market. Since the Directive only requires that fifty-one percent of the market be European, the remaining forty-nine percent is still open to American
media. 10 5
This analysis suffers from several deficiencies. First, the Directive's quota of forty-nine percent applies to all non-EC television.
Therefore, U.S. programming must share the forty-nine percent of
T.E.M. with all other non-E.C. programming. At present the
United States and other non-EC countries combined make up seventy percent of T.E.M. 06 The United States holds roughly fifty
percent of that seventy percent of T.E.M. 107 The Directive's reduction of allowable non-EC programming from the preexisting seventy percent of T.E.M. to forty-nine percent of T.E.M. logically
requires the U.S. and other non-EC programming to decrease proportionately.108 It may be argued that the U.S. market share would
not dramatically drop because U.S. programming is more popular
than other non-EC nation programming and, consequently, that
other non-EC nation programming would suffer disproportionally.
This assertion is not empirically supported given the different
market segments served by the United States and other non-EC
programming. As mentioned above, the European's enjoy Japanese
cartoons which is predominantly a children's market.0 9 If European broadcasters want to preserve their present programming
structure, such as morning television for children and prime time
for adults, each source of programming would have to be propor103. Hollywood Chief Attacks EC Plans as Protagonist,REUTERS, Oct. 31, 1989 (BC
cycle).
104. Id.
105. Presburger & Tyler, supra note 48, at 503.
106. See Clarisse, supra note 101; Ertugrul, supra note 101.
107. Id.
108. The U.S. proportion of T.E.M. will have to shrink from 50% of 70% of T.E.M., or
35% of T.E.M., to 50% of 49% of T.E.M. or 24.5%. This means that U.S. industry will
suffer an approximate 28% decline in its market share. Id. If U.S. market share started at
35% of T.E.M. before the Directive and ended up with 24.5% of T.E.M. after the Directive,
this would constitute a loss of 10% from an original 35% market share or 28% net loss of
the U.S. market share of T.E.M.
109. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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tionately cut.
Second, the assertion that U.S. programming dominates
thirty-five percent of the EC market only describes the U.S. market share in the EC as a whole. The percentage does not reflect
U.S. programming on a state by state basis. The percentage of U.S.
programming shown on European TV varies widely between
countries.1 10
Third, although the Directive applies to individual broadcasters, the above figures do not differentiate on a broadcaster by

broadcaster basis."' The European assertion that few networks
broadcast more than forty-two percent U.S. programming" 2 is disputed by the U.S. entertainment industry.1 13 Assuming that the
European figures are accurate, U.S. programming for individual
network television market will drop from forty-two percent to
twenty-nine percent;" 4 a thirty percent drop from its present market share in a very lucrative market.

Finally, evidence indicates that U.S. sales are already depressed because of the implementation of the Directive. In 1989,
U.S. television sales in the EC declined by 7.2%." ' Some of this
evidence is ancedoteal. It is based on U.S. government and en-

tertainment industry observations indicating that the price paid
for U.S. programming abroad is declining."16 Three of the top five
overseas television markets-the United Kingdom, Italy, and

France-led the decline.

7

France, which has enacted the most se-

vere form of the quota, experienced the most severe decline in U.S.

sales, 51.8% compared to 1988 figures." 8 It should be noted that
during this decline in U.S. television sales, the annual growth rate
110. Ertugul, supra note 101.
111. Directive, supra note 1, at art. 4(1).
112. Hift, supra note 80.
113. Interview with members of the U.S. entertainment industry (Mar. 12, 1991).
114. Assume the non-EC market share of the individual network television market
(I.N.T.M.) reflects the non-EC market of the Total European Market, and remains at 70%,
and further assume the U.S. holds 42% of the total I.N.T.M.. Non-EC countries hold 70%
of the total I.N.T.M, and the United States holds 60% of that non-E.C. market, which is
42% (60% of 70% = 42%). When the non-EC market share (70% of I.N.T.M) is reduced to
49% of I.N.T.M. pursuant to the Directive, and all proportions remain the same, the U.S.
market share will be reduced from its present 42%, to 29% (60% of 49% = 29%).
115. Motion Picture Association of America [hereinafter MPAA] estimates of U.S. industry television sales to the EC. See Request of the MPEAA, supra note 101, at 10.
116. When they bargain for future delivery of U.S. programming, European buyers
bargain for lower prices because they will need less U.S. programming due to the quotas.
This is especially true in the French market. Interviews with U.S. government officials and
entertainment industry executives (Mar. 14 & 15, 1991).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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of TV hours of output in EC countries was greater than ten percent per year. 119 The number of viewers watching satellite television in Europe more than doubled between 1988 and 1989.120 Television revenue in the United Kingdom and Italy increased by
seven percent, in West Germany by thirty percent, and in Den-

mark by

400%.121

The Europeans contend that isolating Article 4 without considering the larger impact of the Directive is unfair. As a result of
the Directive's provisions requiring a freer flow of broadcasting between states and uniform broadcasting regulation in Europe, the
amount of viewing time available throughout Europe will dramatically increase. Therefore, the size of the European market for programming will also increase. Thus, the United States will share in
this larger market and will not be adversely affected by the Directive as a whole. Observers of the industry expect that implementing the Directive will increase total broadcasting time to 440,000
hours by the end of 1992, compared with 250,000 hours in 1987.122
United States government and industry sources respond that at
present European production entities have insufficient capacity to
meet that demand. 2 3 Moreover, principles of free trade require
that the U.S. industry share in the increased market in proportion
to its present market share. 2 4
VI.

THE FIRST OF THREE POSSIBLE RESPONSES: TAKING ACTION

IN THE

GATT

arguments
This section attempts to analyze the possible legal
25
available under GATT in response to the Directive.1
119. Id.
120. Satellite Channel Viewing Soars in Europe, Study Says, DAILY VARIETY, Sept.
12, 1990 (citing a European Television Audience Research Survey).
121. Request by MPEAA, supra note 101, at 12 (citing VIDEONEWS INTERNAT'L, Aug.
1990, no. 6).
122. Sayeste Daser & Brett Richey, U.S. BroadcastersStand to Gain as European TV
Market Grows, 24 Am. MARKETING Ass'N 14, July 9, 1990, at 10.
123. Interviews with U.S. government officials responsible for monitoring the Directive, supra note 120. See also Dovie F. Wingard, Europe 1992: Mass Media Developments,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1990, at 5.
124. Interviews with U.S. government officials responsible for monitoring the Directive, supra note 121.
125. Given the fact that the ultimate decisions of GATT panels can be influenced by
politics, the author has chosen not to engage in a detailed analysis of the politics which
would influence a panel's decision, as doing so would require access to and revelation of
confidential material.
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A. The Purpose Behind InternationalTrade Regulation and
the GATT
International regulation of trade is based upon the assumption
that an international regulatory mechanism is necessary to maintain a stable and efficient system of international trade. Thus, international trade regulation is necessary to prevent nations from
erecting self-serving trade barriers which harm other nations,
spark retaliatory reaction, and result in the severe and inefficient
restriction of international trade. 2 6 This doctrine was based in
part upon economic theory and in part upon the post World War I
experience of nations engaged in substantial world trade.
Those seeking international trade agreements held several
opinions concerning the economics of international trade. They
thought that world trade created wealth for those nations participating in it. World trade enabled larger economies of scale to operate, bringing down the expense of producing goods. It created an
efficient worldwide trading system in which the benefits of an efficient market exchange and the workings of the law of comparative
advantage could take place. Each country would be encouraged to
make those commodities that it had the greatest advantage of producing. The producing state would export them wherever it could
sell them at a price below that prevailing in the importing state
while still making a profit. 11 This global competition in pricing
would drive prices down to the lowest possible price anywhere in
28
the world.1
On the historical side, those who sought international trade
agreements believed that nationally self-interested economic regulation contributed, at a minimum, to misunderstanding and instability in international relations, and, at worst, to war. 29 International trade agreements are necessary even if most. nations act
independently to promote trade. Initially, trade promoting nations
are often met with trade barriers imposed by other states. This
frustrates trade promoting nations and forces retaliation.'" The
historical initiative that brought many nations to form GATT was
the "beggar-my-neighbor" policies of the 1920's and 1930's, which
126. JOHN HOWARD JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT 9 (1969).
127.

Detlev Vagts, TRANSNAT'L Bus. PROBS. 3 (1986). See also Jackson, supra note 126,

at 9.
128. Vagts, supra note 127, at 3.
129. Jackson, supra note 126, at 10.
130. Id.
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involved high tariff laws and the manipulation of currency." 1
These policies damaged world trade and the post World War I
economies of many nations; many leaders believe these policies
were responsible for World War HI.132
As a result of this historical experience in world trade and the
economic theories mentioned above, draftsmen of the GATT articulated several goals in the preparatory conferences and draft
charters. The United States outlined several principles that it
termed basic to the proposed organization:
(1) Existing barriers to international trade should be substantially reduced (2) International trade should be multilateral
rather than bi-lateral (3) International trade should be nondis(5) The rules for international commerce
criminatory ....
should be drafted so that they apply with equal fairness and
equal force to the external trade of all nations regardless of
whether their internal economies were organized upon the basis
of individualism, collectivism or some combination of the two.'3 3
Some concerns were political as well as economic. The Contracting
Parties felt that GATT ought to be limited so as not to impose too
much uniformity upon particular social and political systems, or
too greatly restrict the individual freedom of particular nations to
pursue national goals.134 This system of allocating power between
local, national, and international entities has been analogized to
13 5
the issue of federalism.
Other political goals were articulated at the 1947 Geneva Conference by the United Nations official representative. He said:
Apart from the fact that this meeting will play an important
part in determining the course of the United Nations in economic matters, it may well be that our political future will be
affected by what happens here. Political frictions too often flow
Unrest and trouble
from difficulties in trade relationships ....
16
breed in empty stomachs. .
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 9, 37.
Id.
See U.N. Doc. EPCT/PV.2, at 5 (1946); see also Jackson, supra note 126, at 54.
Id. at 29.
Id.
U.N. Doc., supra note 133; see also Jackson, supra note 126, at 55-56.
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B. The Threshold Question for the Applicability of GATT:
Does the Regulation Affect a Good or a Service?
GATT applies only to goods and not to services."'
Consequently, the threshold question of whether the Directive violates GATT is the issue of whether the Directive affects goods or
services. In order to resolve this issue it must be determined
whether television, itself, is a good or a services. No GATT working party, panel, or any other body which has been delegated the
138
task of interpreting GATT has expressly resolved this issue.
The issue of defining the concept of a service is an extremely
difficult task and has been a point of much disagreement among
GATT parties. 3 9 In 1985, GATT held a conference in which delegates from the working parties presented issues and factual information concerning international trade and the regulation of services. 4 During that conference, a number of delegates articulated
the proposition that there is no commonly accepted definition of

services.""
In the absence of a common agreement amongst the delegates

as to the difference between a good and a service, one must look to
other sources. Commentators often give examples of service industries as including accounting, legal representation, engineering and
construction services, tourism, banking, transportation, insurance,
equipment leasing, hotel and management services, data banks and
data transfer, licensing, advertising, and computer services."2
137. The preamble of GATT refers only to the "production and exchange of goods."
GATT, supra note 84, at preamble. The Interpretative Note to Article XVII, 2, states,
"[t]he term 'goods' is limited to products as understood in commercial practice, and is not
intended to include the purchase or sale of services." Id. at art. XVII, interpretative note.
The Europeans have taken this position in the debate concerning the Directive as well.
Cate, supra note 5, at 5. Also note that some member states including the United States
have it on their agenda to amend GATT to apply to services. See Terrence G. Berg, Trade
in Services: Toward a "Development Round" of GATT Negotiations Benefiting Both Developing and IndustrializedStates, 28 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (Winter 1987).
138. See Jackson, supra note 126, at 24-25.
139. Berg, supra note 137, at 3.
140. Summary of Issues Raised in Exchange of Information in Services, GATT doc.
MDF/W/58 (1985).
141. Id. at 2, 5. India, Japan, the United States, Canada, the EEC, and Egypt agreed
that there was no common definition of services. Id.
142. See Paul Bravender-Coyle, InternationalTrade in Services and the GATT, 13
AUSTRALIAN Bus. L. REV. 217, 218 (1985); Raymond J. Krommenacker, Trade-Related Services and GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE 510, 510-11 (1979). See also Mario Kakabadse, Trade
in Services and the Uraguay, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 284 (1989); Bernard Ascher, Multilateral Negotiations on Trade in Services: Concepts, Goals, Issues, 19 GA. J. INT'S & COMP.
L. 392 (1989).
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Commentators often include "motion-picture" in the above list. 14 3
It has been suggested that what characterizes these industries as
"trade-related service industries" is that their principal output is
not tangible.'4 4
It is difficult to characterize the "principal output"'4 5 of the
television industry. Is it the audiovisual product, such as the tangible video tape, which is the result of the combined efforts of actors,
directors, technicians, and cameramen working together? Is it the
image which appears on televisions screen? Is it the television signal? Arguably, the video tape is the principal output since it is the
item that retains economic value. Individuals do not pay for the'
television signal, or the image on the television, but the broadcaster does pays for the use of the video tape. If video tape is the
principal output of the television industry, and video tape is a'
product, then television is a product.
However, this "principal output" theory is of limited use.
There is no leading authority on how to define what constitutes the
"principal output." The "principal output" theory of services was
probably designed for the purpose of conceptualizing the initial
stages of GATT negotiations on services, rather than as a legal46 definition governing the applicability of the GATT provisions.
The "principal output theory" is not the only rational criteria
which characterizes services industries. These industries have
other elements in common. They do not require the use of a tangible product in a manner which is inseparable from the other activities of the industry. For example, an accountant's ability to conduct an audit is not inextricably bound up with up any tangible
product. The tools of accountants are variable and changing. Historically, accountants audited by hand using pencils. In later years,
calculators were used. Presently, many use computers. None of
these tools were so inherent in the process of auditing that they
were inseparable from it. The real substance of accounting has always been the application of intellectual property and formulas by
a human being to a set of intangible symbols and numbers. This
process does not require any particular tangible good and therefore, is considered a service, not a good.
Restricting these industries through regulation does not have
an impact upon tangible goods. In the international arena, regula143.
144.
145.
146.

See infra text accompanying notes 180-184.
Bravender-Coyle, supra note 142, at 218; Krommenacker, supra note 142, at 510.
See infra text accompanying notes 150-52.
See generally id.
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tions which discriminate against foreign trade related services do
not have a negative economic impact upon the treatment of tangible foreign goods. For instance, in many countries foreign banking
is regulated by restricting the number of foreign banks that may
enter the market, the types of business they conduct, and the
amount and type of assets they can own. 4 ' Often foreign insurance
companies may not offer certain policies for sale unless local au14 8
thorities decide that local companies cannot offer those services.
Many states require foreign accounting firms to be supervised by
local firms in order to conduct audits.' 4 9 The restrictions on these
industries does not directly affect the value of foreign owned products associated with these services. When government regulation
restricts foreign accountants from auditing, such regulation does
not devalue any tangible foreign product. 5 '
These service industries, are distinctly different than the television industry. Unlike the other industries mentioned above, the
creation of television is the result of the interaction of several tangible products. The broadcaster applies electricity to a broadcasting device which applies that electricity to the video tape or other
audiovisual product. This interaction creates a television signal,
which is then received by a television set. Although if considered in
isolation, the signal may be a service,' the transformation of this
signal into the final television product requires the use of goods.' 5'
Therefore, even if one considers the broadcasting of a television
signal a service, the production of the ultimate television product
requires a combination of services and goods.
It is not only this interdependent means of production which
differentiates television from other industries. It is the economic
impact which the regulation of one element of television production has on the other elements that sets the television industry
apart from service industries. This impact has significant international free trade ramifications. When a state regulates the broad147. Ascher, supra note 142, at 395.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. One could theoretically argue that a financial statement is the result of an audit
and is, therefore, a tangible good. By making it illegal for foreign accountants to conduct
audits, the value of that financial statement is devalued to the point of being worthless.
However, a financial statement is not a tangible good. It cannot be traded or valued except

as a one time service to the patron who requests it.
151. The United States and the EC dispute this point. See text accompanying footnotes 158-61.
152. This is not necessarily true of live television. However, the Directive does not
affect U.S. live television, but non-EC recorded television.
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casting of television by discriminating against the airing of foreign
made audiovisual products, 5 3 as the Directive does, the value of
that product is affected.154 This impact is highly relevant. The real
economic impact of television regulation is upon a tangible good,
the audiovisual product, and not upon the broadcasting of the signal. Since the Directive interferes with the free market for television product between states, it contradicts the policies of the
GATT concerned with world wide economic efficiency. 155 The present world market for television highly values U.S. television products. The EC Directive artificially limits consumer access to that
product by raising its price'5 s and interfering with the television
industry's economies of scale. 5
The Directive regulates the use of the audiovisual product, not
the signal. The Directive does not require that the broadcast television signal used must be of EC origin or that European broadcasters must be EC owned. It only requires that the work used by
the broadcaster be of EC origin. Therefore, the regulation concerns
an audiovisual work, a product, not the television signal associated
153. Note that it may be debated whether the actual audiovisual product-the video
tape-which contains the material that will ultimately be broadcast is a product. Upon close
examination it becomes clear that it is. The audiovisual product is tangible, unlike the items
categorized by most commentators as services. Moreover, even Guiseppe Saachi, infra note
164, which held that a television signal was a service, also held that, "trade in material,
sound recordings, films, apparatus and other products used for the diffusion of television
signals is subject to the rules relating to the freedom of movement for goods (under EC
law)." Id.
One should not get sidetracked with the notion that there is an intangible aspect of
intellectual property involved here; that it is not the physical audiovisual product itself
which is being devalued but rather the intangible intellectual property rights embodied in
that product. The fact that a legal regime, i.e. copyright law, designates rights to the use of
a physical product is not new or abnormal in the world of goods. Intellectual property also
governs the use of computer goods, electronic technology, etc. Moreover, even outside the
regime of intellectual property, when a state enacts regulation which devalues a foreign good
it does so through limiting the rights associated with that good. For instance, even in the
case of a basic restriction on imports, the state does not physically destroy the imported
good. Rather, it removes one of the rights associated with that good, the right to move it
freely, into the state.
Finally, one should note that the language of the Directive recognizes that television
programming is a product. Article 4 of the Directive requires broadcasters reserve for "European Works" a majority of their transmission time. In defining "European Works", the
Directive refers to works that are "made by" producers with residence in European Countries. Request of the MPEAA, supra note 101, at 5.
154. See text accompanying note 126.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 131-132.
156. See infra text accompanying note 221.
157. Often feature film studios and television show producers rely on the sale of reruns
of a few successful shows in foreign markets to make up for the financial failures of the
majority television shows or movies.
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with it.
One may look to the domestic law of the Contracting Parties
for guidance as to whether television is a service.15s Both the
United States and the EC have held that electricity is a good, not a
service. In Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. vs. The City and
County of San Franciscoi 5 9 a California Court of Appeals held
that "[e]lectricity is a commodity, which like other goods, can be
manufactured, transported or sold."'' ° That case involved a contract proposal made by the City of San Francisco to furnish equipment for the development of an electric plant. The contract required that all equipment covered by the contract be made in the
United States. The court held such an agreement conflicted with
GATT, Article III, which prohibits discrimination in the purchase
of products based on their national origin, and was therefore illegal. The Defendants claimed that an exception to Article III applied. The exception provides
the provisions of this Article [III] shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes
and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in
the production of goods for commercial sale.' 6'
However, the court held
the exception contained in paragraph [8 of Article III] is not operative . . . since the turbines and other equipment are for use
in the generation of electric power for resale and hence for use
in the production of goods for sale. Electricity is a commodity
which, like other goods, can be manufactured, transported and
sold. 6 '
If electricity is a good because it can be manufactured, sold, or
transported, then it follows that a television signal must also be a
good. A signal is only a modified form of electricity which may also
' 63
be "manufactured, sold or transported.'
This reasoning has been refuted in the European court of Justice. The case of Guiseppe Saachi'" held that although electric
158.

Jackson, supra note 126, at 25.

159. 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962).
160.

Id. at 819.

161.

GATT, supra note 84, at art. III, T 8(a); see also Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.,

208 Cal. App. 2d at 819.

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 155/73, 439 (1974).
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energy was a good, a television broadcast was not. The court held
that the technical fact that electricity is used in broadcasting was
not relevant in resolving the issue. The relevant point was that information was being broadcasted. 63 The implication was that information cannot be a good. This conclusion has been subject to
criticism by European commentators. 6 6
Aside from looking to the decisions of domestic courts, one can
also look to possible consequences to GATT, should it hold that
television is a good. Such a finding could open the GATT forum to
a number of complaints involving several analogous barriers effecting industries such as those which provide services such as data
and money transfers. The transfer of money and information may
be accomplished by electricity and therefore would be a product.
This rationale breaks down any distinction between goods and services.' The question then becomes what are the negative consequences of the breaking down of the distinction between goods and
services. Contracting Parties continue to have barriers to services
for a number of reasons. First, many developing nations resist
trade in services because they view developing indigenous service
industries through "traditional infant industry models," rather
than through foreign presence, as crucial to economic
16
development.
Second, an underlying fear is that "[b]ringing services under
the GATT free trade regime is likely to interfere with domestic
'69
economic policies and thereby undermine national autonomy.'
This concern is shared by the European Court of Justice as implied by its reasoning in Saachi. As mentioned above, the Saachi
court chose to avoid the technical question of whether a television
signal is simply electricity and therefore a good. Instead, the court
165. Id.
166. One commentator stated,
We are faced in reality with two different forms of transportation, the difference
being that between sending a photographic print or matrix from the Financial
Times in London to its second printing plant in Frankfurt by post... and
sending it by wireless or teleprinter or fax. The end result is exactly the same:
the physical object in London has been transported into the hands of the recipient in Frankfurt. The conceptual blockage which prevents this equivalence being
acted upon is the lawyer's reluctance to move from Newtonian physics to quantum physics, an inability to attribute physical characteristics to anything that
cannot be held in the hand and thus an unwillingness to accept that one can
"import" electronic signals.
Neville March Hunnings, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 564, 568 (1980).
167. Id.
168. Ascher, supra note 142, at 399.
169. Berg, supra note 137, at 3.
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analyzed a television broadcast as information and immediately
concluded it was a service. This view implies that "information"
holds a special position and is not subject to being "commoditized"
as normal goods. The EC may argue that information has a special
significance because its cultural content affects the receiving state's
national identity. Forcing a nation to remove all barriers to receiving information goes beyond the original intention of the draftsmen of GATT. It goes beyond the principles of free trade and infringes upon national sovereignty and identity. The EC may then
argue that GATT overstepped the boundaries of its role as wealth
enhancer to become an institution for cultural conformity and
homogeneity.
If GATT found that all service barriers that had a disparate
impact on goods violated its charter this would make GATT too
far reaching: complaining states would attempt to trace the indirect effects of regulating services on goods, even when such effects
would be remote.
The United States has a number of available responses. It may
respond to the objection of cultural infringement by showing that
in past disputes, GATT refused to recognize cultural protection as
a justification for trade discrimination based on national origin. In
the case of Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather,170 Japan
maintained restrictions upon the import of certain semi-processed
and finished leather. Japan had not invoked any provision of
GATT to justify maintenance of those restrictions. The panel
found that,
the special historical, cultural and socioeconomic circumstances
referred to by Japan could not be taken into account by it in
this context since its [the panel's) terms of reference were to examine the matter 'in light of the relevant GATT provisions' and
those provisions did not provide such a justification for import
restrictions. 171
The panel found that this restriction violated Article XI:A. 172 This
finding implies that GATT does not recognize cultural factors as
relevant to a determination of whether its provisions apply. Therefore, cultural justifications cannot override the GATT non-discrimination provisions.
Even if one accepted the argument that domestic cultural in170. BISD 31S/94 (1984).
171. Id. at 111, %44.
172. Id.
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tegrity was important to the policies of GATT, 17 3 and that in a
borderline case national cultural integrity should be a factor, this
argument is not applicable to the Directive. The Directive is not a
restriction which is based on the foreign content of the broadcast,
17 4
but rather upon its point of origin, and the origin of its creators.
A television show with U.S. themes which was made in Europe
would not be subject to the quota of the Directive, while a U.S.
show made about European themes would.1 75 Therefore, the Directive is an economic, not a cultural regulation. It is simply an alternative form of a structure originally designed to subsidize local
film industries.176 The Europeans viewed it this way when drafting
the Directive. The relevant chapter heading of the Directive setof disting the domestic broadcast quotas is entitled "Promotion
77
tribution and production of television programmes ."
The United States also has a response to the fear that complaining states would use a "disparate impact on goods" theory to
claim that every regulation of a service with even a minute impact
on goods would be a violation of GATT. GATT could use the following proposed standard: its provisions would only be violated
where three conditions existed: (1) the activity would be extricably
bound up with a good; (2) regulation of the activity would have a
direct and primary impact upon a foreign good; and (3) the regulation substantially alters the market conditions in favor of domestic
goods. 178 Using such a standard prevents unintended and far
reaching results of GATT, while still invalidating local laws which
facially only regulate services, but in fact have their substantive
impact upon goods.
GATT contemplated this concept when it dealt with restrictions upon the showing of films. Article IV handles the issue of
whether states can require a minimum amount of cinema screen
time to be devoted to films of domestic origin. 17 The relevant provisions provide as follows:
ARTICLE IV
Special Provisions relating to Cinematograph Films
If any contracting party establishes or maintains internal quan173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
Directive, supra note 1, at art. 6.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
Directive, supra note 1, at ch. 3.
See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
GATT, supra note 84, at art. IV.
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titative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films,
such regulations shall take the form of screen quotas which shall
conform to following requirements:
(a) screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematograph
films of national origin during a specified minimum proportion
of the total screen time actually utilized, over a specified period
of not less than one year, in the commercial exhibition of all
films of whatever origin, and shall hot be allocated formally or
in effect among sources of supply;
(b) With the exception of screen time reserved for films of national origin under a screen quota, screen time including that
released by administrative action from screen time reserved for
films of national origin, shall not be allocated formally or in effect among sources of supply; ....

180

Article IV was designed as an exception to the Article III National
Treatment obligation. Article III required that each Contracting
Party's laws and regulations treat foreign and domestic goods
equally favorably.'l8 This has important implications. Because the
drafters of GATT felt the need to include this provision indicates
that without it, screen quotas violated GATT.'82 This indicates
that the process of showing film in a theater constitutes the use of
a good. By analogy, one could argue that the broadcasting of television does as well. However, there is a flip side to this argument.
If television is a good by virtue of the fact that film is good, then
an exception which allows screen quotas could allow television
quotas. This issue will be resolved in the following detailed discussion of actual violations of GATT provisions.

C. Violations of the National Treatment Provision and
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions Provision
1.

Application of the National Treatment Provision

The National Treatment provision, Article III, states in its relevant sections,
Article III
National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and
other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements
affecting the INTERNAL SALE, OFFERING FOR SALE, PURCHASE,
180. Id.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 134-35.
182. Application of GATT to International Trade in Television Programs, GATT
doc. L/1646, 3 (1961).
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TRANSPORTATION, DISTRIBUTION, OR USE OF PRODUCTS

and internal

quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use
of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production...
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations,
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use .
10. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any contracting party from establishing or maintaining internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films and
meeting the requirements of Article IV."s"
The drafters of GATT felt that unless they included the Article IV
exception to Article III, screen quotas violated Article 111.184 However, the question then becomes how did screen quotas violate Article III.
The history preceding the enactment of Article III would
prove helpful in understanding this issue. The United States felt
that the subject of national treatment was necessary to a trade
agreement and an "indispensable minimum" to GATT.' Both the
United States and the United Kingdom had similar "national
treatment" clauses in many of their own commercial treaties.'8 6
However, before such a clause could be inserted into the GATT a
controversy erupted.
One group of delegates wanted the national treatment obligation to apply only to those items included in the tariff Schedules. 8 ' They felt that the sole purpose of general provisions such
as Article III was the, protection of tariff concessions. Thus, any
general trade conduct obligations would have to await the formation of a more institutional international trade organization. 8 But
this proposition failed. Instead, the draftsmen decided that the national treatment obligation would be drafted and interpreted to
protect not only scheduled concessions but also prevent the use of
183.

KENNETH R. SIMMONDS & BRIAN H.W. HILL, EDS., LAW & PRACTICE UNDER THE

GATT, art. III, t 1, 4, 10, at 7, 9 (1988).
184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra text accompanying note 182.
Jackson, supra note 126, at 277.
Id. at 277.
Id.

188.

U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV.10, at 13-15 (1947).
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government regulations as a system of domestic protection.'8 9 Several reasons were given for including the national treatment provision: (1) it was required by existing international commercial trade
policy; (2) many treaties already had it; and (3) it was necessary
not only to protect the items on the GATT schedule, but all exports and imports.9 0
The preparatory history of Article III, although complex, indicates that the provision was intended to be interpreted broadly
and was also intended to cover a wide range of governmental regulation which could be used to treat local products more favorably
than foreign ones. Each attempt by representatives to narrow its
affect was rebuffed in favor of broader, more far reaching language. 9 ' The language of Article III, paragraph 4 supports this interpretation. The terms are broad, indicating an intent to have a
far reaching effect. The Article III terms that create the obligation
to treat imported products "no less favorably" than like products
of national origin "in respect of all laws, regulations, and requirements, affecting their, internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use" demonstrate an intent to prevent virtually any governmental regulatory attempt to benefit a local good at the expense of a foreign one.
The EC treats foreign made television programming less favorably than domestic. It governmentally limits non-EC television
program "distribution or use" by restricting the amount of time it
may be broadcast on European television.1 9
GATT cases support this proposition. The case of Italian Discrimination Against Imported AgriculturalMachinery' 93 involved
an Italian law which provided special credit facilities to farmers for
the purchase of agricultural machinery produced in Italy. The
GATT panel recommended that the law be modified so that credit
facilities would be made available for the purchase of agricultural
machinery, whatever its origin. The panel interpreting Article III
in light of the Italian law stated,
the text of paragraph 4 referred both in English and French to
laws and regulations and requirements affecting internal sale,
purchase, . .. and to laws, regulations, and requirements governing the conditions of sale or purchase. The selection of the
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Jackson, supra note 126, at 277.
Id.
GATT, supra note 84, at art. III
Directive, supra note 1, at art. 4.
7/S BISD 60 (1959).
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word "affecting" would imply, in the opinion of the Panel, that
the drafters of the Article intended to cover in paragraph 4 not
only the laws and regulations which directly governed the conditions of sale or purchase but also any laws or regulations which
might adversely modify the conditions of competition between
194
the domestic and imported products on the internal market.
Imposing quotas on the broadcast of foreign made television adversely modifies the conditions of competition between domestic
and imported products in a nation's internal market. 19 5 By limiting
the amount of market share foreign made television is permitted to
occupy, the EC is modifying the conditions of competition between
EC and non-EC produced television to benefit local product. This
is evidenced by the decrease in U.S. sales and the reduction in
price of U.S. programming due to the impact of the Directive.'9 6 .
The ItalianMachinery case lends further support to the argument that GATT disallows the regulation of a service which results
in the less favorable treatment of a foreign good. 197 Even if GATT
were to find that television broadcasting was a service, under Italian Machinery the Directive would still violate Article III. In Italian Machinery it was the use of credit facilities, a service like
banking, which treated domestically produced agricultural machinery more favorably than foreign made machinery. When the panel
required that credit facilities be made available for the purchase of
agricultural machinery, whatever its origin, the panel held that a
state cannot use the regulation of a domestically produced service
to discriminate in favor of a domestic good.
The Directive's regulation of television broadcasting violates
Article III. Article III was intended to have far reaching application. It was intended to void any regulation that hinders the use of
a foreign product vis a vis a domestic one, or modifies the conditions of competition between foreign and domestic products in the
internal market. Assuming arguendo, that television broadcasting
is. a service, Article III still intended to prevent the regulation of
television broadcasting which results in a domestic audiovisual
good receiving more favorable treatment than a foreign one.
The question then becomes whether the Article IV exemption
for cinematographic films applies to television. When the drafters
created Article IV, they did not contemplate it applying to televi194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 64.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 115-21.
See generaliy text accompanying note 154.
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sion. In 1962, GATT created a working party to study the application of GATT to television.' 98
Although the working party was unable to agree on what action to take,' 9 9 it did create draft recommendations in several alternative versions. France dissented from all of these, asserting
that it was premature to consider the issue of television regulation.
It expected that new technical developments, particularly the introduction of communications satellites, would change the intrinsics of the communications field. France felt that it would be more
appropriate to discuss the application of GATT provisions to television once the full impact of that development had been
evaluated. 0°
Aside from the French dissent, each of the recommendations
started with the statement,
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, RECOGNIZING that, when
the General Agreement was drawn up, international trade in television programmes was virtually non-existent so that the implications of the application of the relevant provisions of the General Agreement to such trade were not considered. .. 201
This statement of the draft recommendation, although never part
of a formal agreement, indicates a common understanding of the
parties. The ramifications of trade in television, unlike film, were
never contemplated. The drafters of GATT did not consider the
major economic impact that television would have. The draft recommendation also stated,
RECOGNIZING that trade in television programmes [sic] has
similarities to trade in cinematograph films for which special
provision was made in the General Agreement...20'
Apparently, the drafters concluded that television shared some
characteristics with film, although the extent to which these characteristics were shared was unclear. The only conclusions that can
be drawn from the statements of this 1962 working party are as
follows: television is not excepted from the National Treatment
provisions of Article III; and unlike film, was not contemplated in
Article IV.
Article IV was intended to be construed narrowly. Most mem198.
199.

GATT, supra note 84, at Analytic Index, art. IV.
GATT Doc., L/1741 (1962).

200. Id. at 6-8.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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bers of the 1962 Working Party on International Television found
that at the
recognized that the aptime of drafting Article III, it was, ...
plication of these provisions [provisions of Article III] could
cause difficulty. The tariff was not an effective means of protecting domestic cinematograph film industry and many countries
found it necessary to resort to quotas on screen time. In recognition of this, Article IV of the GATT, the provisions which are an
exception to those in Article III, permits the establishment of
screen quotas in favor of films nationally produced. 0 3
This drafting history indicates that Article IV was intended as
a specific concession to a specific need of the Contracting Parties
at the time they signed GATT. They wanted to protect a particular industry-the film industry. They chose a particular solution,
the use of quotas as opposed to tariffs to create that protection.
This history shows that Article IV was not intended to be read
broadly. It was not intended to carve out all visual communication
activity from the non-discrimination provisions. Rather, it was intended as a specific compromise tailored to protecting local film
industries during a time when they were in their infancy. It cannot
be drawn from this narrowly conceived and specific provision that
the Article IV should apply to the television industry of the 1990's.
The television industry had not been conceived of at the signing of
GATT, nor had its basic characteristics been contemplated. Some
members of the working party argued that Article IV provides a
useful analogy of how television should be handled.2 0 4 However, at
the working party there was much disagreement as to the exact
relationship between television and film, and no recommendation
was implemented concerning this issue. Since the analogy on parallel terms was considered but never accepted, Article IV does not
apply to television.
2.

General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions Provision

Some have argued that the Directive, in addition to violating
the Article III National Treatment provision, violates, Article XI,
the Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions Provision of GATT. 0 5
This provision states,
Article XI
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 4.
205. Request of the MPEAA, supra note 101, at 4.
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General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or
export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.2"'
A logical argument similar to the argument made under Article III
could also be made under Article XI. The EC is maintaining a
"defacto" import quota on the amount of non-EC television allowed into the EC by putting limitations on the amount of non-EC
television programs shown by EC broadcasters. 0 7 "If a broadcaster
cannot show more than a certain percentage of foreign programming, the broadcaster will not buy programming that it cannot
use."2 0 However, GATT panels have held that Article XI does not
apply to such situations. One panel stated that,
the General Agreement distinguishes between measures affectingg the "importation" of products, which are regulated in Article XI:1, and those affecting "imported products", which are
dealt with in Article III. If Article XI:1 were interpreted broadly
to cover internal requirements, Article III would be partly superfluous .... The Panel did not find, either in drafting history of the General Agreement or in previous cases examined by
any evidence justifying such
the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
2
an interpretation of Article XI. 09
This interpretation requires that Article XI:1 only apply to regulations which govern the actual importing of the product into the
country. However, once the imported product is in the country, Article III, not Article XI:1, applies to internal requirements which
affect it. Since the EC regulation does not put quotas on the
amount of actual audiovisual product which comes into the EC,
only Article III is applicable.
3.

Issues of Nullification and Impairment

Since the Directive violates the legal obligations of Article III,
the question becomes whether the United States needs to show the
206. SIMMONDS & HILL, supra note 183, at 22-3.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 6.
209. Canada-Administrationof the Foreign Investment Review Act, Report of the
Panel, GATT Doc L/5504 (1984), 140. See also Jackson, supra note 126, at 315.
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extent of the economic impact of the Directive upon trade in U.S.
television to make a prima facie case of nullification or impairment. The short answer is no. In the Understanding Regarding
Dispute Settlement2 1 the Contracting Parties stated,
In practice ... cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under the General Agreement, the action is
considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. A prima facie case of nullification or impairment
would ipso facto require consideration of whether the circumstances are serious enough to justify the authorization of suspension of concessions or obligations, if the contracting party bringing the complain so requests. This means that there is normally
a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact
on other contracting parties, and in such cases, it is up to the
contracting parties against whom the complaint has been
" '
brought to rebut the charge.21
Therefore, where a panel finds that the EC has breached Article
III through enacting the Directive, there is a presumption that this
has an adverse impact on the United States.
D. Conclusion
The GATT does apply to the Directive. The Directive's framework recognizes that television programming is a good. The television industry differs from most service industries because the production of television requires the use of tangible products. The use
of discriminatory regulation of television broadcasting has a negative economic impact upon a tangible product. Even if television
broadcasting were considered a service, a GATT panel has held
that the regulation of a domestic service cannot be used to benefit
a domestic good at the expense of a foreign one. Such discriminatory regulation interferes with the free trade model upon which
GATT was founded.
The drafters of GATT believed that governmentally imposed
limits on the screening time of audiovisual works constituted quotas on a product. The fact that they felt the need to make a limited exception for film-screen quotas shows that they believed that
restrictions on the use of audiovisual works violated GATT obligations. Since GATT applies to audiovisual works, and the Directive
regulates the use of audiovisual works, GATT applies to the Direc210. BISD 26S/210 (1979).
211. Id. at 216, 5.
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tive. Any argument that television regulation should be excepted
from GATT obligations because of its cultural significance must be
rejected. GATT panels have explicitly rejected cultural justifications for violating GATT obligations in other contexts.
The Directive violates the Article III provisions and their purposes. Further, although there are some analogies between film and
television, Article IV does not provide an exception for television,
as it does for film. Article IV was intended as a compromise solution to a specific problem. It was not created as a broad provision,
far reaching in its application. The concept of television was not
contemplated when Article IV was enacted. Since Article III is far
reaching in its application and bars discriminatory regulation of
television, while Article IV is narrowly construed and excepts only
cinema films from the Article III obligation, the Directive violates
Article III without exception. The Directive does not violate Article XI:1, since it applies to imported goods, not the importation of
goods. Finally, the United States need not prove actual economic
impact of the Directive to show nullification.
VII.

THE SECOND OF THREE RESPONSES: THE DIRECTIVE AS A

VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF LIBERALIZATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE
OPERATIONS

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was created in 1961 as a successor to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation.21 2 The OECD was
designed,
-to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries,
while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to
the development of the world economy ....
- to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral,
nondiscriminatory basis in accordance with international
obligations. 13
The OECD serves several functions. It sets up several committees
212.

Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,

Dec. 14, 1960, 12 UST 1728, TIAS No. 4891;
278 (1986).
213. ORGANIZATION

DAVEY,

& W.

DAVEY, INT'L

EcON.

REL.,

FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERALIZATION

OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS,
INT'L TRADE REG.:

JOHN JACKSON

GATT,

inside front cover (1990). See also EDMUND McGoVERN,
56 (1986); JACKSON &

THE UNITED STATES, & THE EUR. COMMUNITY

supra note 212.
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to examine world trade topics.2 14 It also generates recommendations and decisions. These are binding unless a member has not
voted for them or has not complied with its own constitutional requirements.2 15 Often member states have engaged in "understandings," or "gentlemen's agreements," rather than formal treaties because of their reluctance to create binding agreements.2 1 6
In an OECD departure from its usual non-binding acts it created the Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible operations
through a Council Decision. 1 7 The Code is legally binding because
it was promulgated as the result of a council decision.2" 8 The basic
obligations of the Code are
Article 1
General Undertakings
a. Member states shall eliminate between one another, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, restrictions on current
invisible transactions and transfers, hereinafter called "current
this purpose are
invisible operations." Measures designed for '219
liberalization.
of
"measures
called
hereinafter
Article 2
Measures of Liberalization
a. Members shall grant any authorization required for a current
specified in an item set out in Annex A to
invisible operation
220
this Code.
The relevant section of Annex A states,
E. Films
E/1. Exportation, importation, distribution and use of printed
films and other recordings-whatever the means of reproducor cinema exhibition, or for television
tion-for private
221
broadcasts.
The United States could argue that the EC is restricting the
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. McGOVERN, supra note 213.
217. OECD, Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations, looseleaf [hereinafter Code]. See also McGoVERN, supra note 213, at 53.
218. Id.
219. Code, supra note 217, at art. 1.
220. Id. at art. 2.
221. Code, supra note 217, at Annex A, E/1. These provisions do not apply to Canada.
The US and some EC members states have made reservations to this part of the Code.
McGOVERN, supra note 213. Additionally, Annex IV to Annex A allows for national screen
quotas similar to GATT, art. IV.
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United State's ability to distribute its films through television
broadcasts. The EC might respond that these provisions only apply where regulations limit the importation of material. They do
not apply once the audiovisual product is in the state. However,
the provision states that it applies to the "importation, distribution and use of printed films. . . whatever the means of reproduction" including "television broadcasts."2 '2 2 This language indicates
that drafters of Annex A considered that the duty to "liberalize"
applied to restrictions on the "use" of audiovisual products, even
once inside the importing state.
The EC could argue that the commitments contained in the
these sections only require a minimum act. They only require liberalization of restrictions to the point of authorization of the invisible operation,212 3 nothing more. They would interpret the Article 1
statement "Member states shall eliminate between one another, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2, restrictions on current
"224 to mean that member states have an
invisible transactions ..
obligation to eliminate restrictions on invisible operations only to
the extent that Article 2 requires. Since Article 2 only requires authorization of the invisible operation, the Directive satisfies that
requirement because it does authorize the broadcasting of U.S.
films on television, it just limits the quantity.
The question then becomes whether the "obligation to authorize" is a minimal requirement? If a state only allows for a fixed
amount of U.S. material to be exploited, is such an allowance sufficient to fulfill the Article I obligation? If such an interpretation
were accepted it would make the obligation meaningless. Under
such an interpretation, if the Directive allowed only one percent
U.S. programming, U.S. programming would be technically authorized and hence the obligation would not be violated. For the Article 1 obligation to have any meaning it must require unlimited
authorization.
There is further evidence of this interpretation. Like the
drafters of Article IV of GATT, the drafters of this provision felt
the need to draft an exception for national screen quotas. 5 Therefore, they must have believed that screen quotas violated the Article 1 obligation. Screen quotas, like the Directive, do not necessarily impose a full prohibition upon the showing of foreign films.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Code, supra note 217, at art. 1-2.
Id. at art. 1.
Id. at Annex A, Annex IV.
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They may simply limit such showings in favor of some specific percentage of domestic material. If these quotas violated the Code
without an exception so would quotas on foreign material shown
on television.
However, no argument can be made that the screen quota exception applies to television. The Code clearly contemplated television. It expressly provides for the removal of restrictions on television broadcasts. 2 6 If the drafters of the Code had intended for the
exceptions for screen quotas to include television broadcasts they
would have provided for it.
The Directive violates the obligation of the Code in another
respect. The Code provides:
A member shall not discriminate as between other Members in
authorizing current invisible operations which are listed in 2An2
nex A and which are subject to any degree of liberalization. 1
If member states follow the Directive, they violate Article 9.
They will be favoring the television programming of other European States over the United States. This is especially compelling
considering that notwithstanding Article 4 of the Directive, the
purpose of the Directive is increase the movement of trade in television programmes between member states of the EC.2 2 If restrictions on the free movement of television programs between member states are removed, while analogous restrictions on U.S.
programming are increased, Article 9 is violated. EC states are discriminating in9 favor of each other in "authorizing current invisible
'22
operations.
Using the Directive's quotas to subsidize the European entertainment industry does not further the OECD goal of aiding economic expansion. If people do not like what is being shown on
television they will simply go elsewhere for entertainment. Observers of the European television market believe that if quotas on
226. Id. at Annex A, § E.
227. Id. at art. 9.
228. The preamble to the Directive states as follows:
Whereas it is essential for the Member States to ensure the prevention of any
acts which may prove detrimental to freedom of movement and trade in television programmes . ...
Directive, supra note 1, at pmbl. 1 20.
Article 2 of the Directive states:
Member States shall ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict retransmission on their territory of television broadcasts from other Member States for
reasons which fall within the fields coordinated by this Directive.
Id. at art. 2(2).
229. See supra note 231.
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U.S. programming take hold in Europe, European viewers will simply find alternative means of seeing shows that they cannot see on
television. They will just have to pay more to see them."30

VIII. THE THIRD OF THREE RESPONSES: ATTACKING THE
DIRECTIVE AS A VIOLATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE OF
THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION
A. The
Information

Concept of

the International Free Flow

of

The doctrine of the international free flow of information or
free expression stems from the human right to receive and impart
information. This right has had lesser and greater degrees of respect throughout world history. It was not respected in antiquity.213 1 It started to be recognized in England in 1644, and was
recognized in the United States and in France about one hundred
and fifty years later. 232 However, it only to received widespread international recognition after World War 11.233
It was said at the General Assembly of the United Nations
that freedom of information-the right to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas is the touchstone of all freedoms to which
the United Nations is consecrated. 3 4 The right of free expression
is considered by United States courts and commentators as fundamental to the other freedoms 2 5 and forms the content of those
freedoms.23 6

Although the importance of this right has hit a high point during the later half of this century, it has been interpreted differently
depending upon the political objectives of the interpreter. The
United States has generally had the most liberal practice concerning regulation of the free flow of information.237 Third world nations and the ex-Soviet Union adopted more restrictive prac230. Video rentals are one alternative. Telephone Interview with Kathy Goodman, Associate, White & Case (Mar. 31, 1991).
231. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INT'L LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 182
(Vol. 1 1984).

232. Id.
233. Id.
234.
235.
236.
237.

G.A. Res 59, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946), at 95.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
MERON, supra note 231.
See Cate, supra note 2, at 371-92 (discussion of conflict between the United

States and third world nations over free flow of information and the New World Information Order).
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tices. 23 These divergent practices make it difficult to locate a
universally accepted custom which forms the basis of the current
international law of free expression.2 39
B. The Doctrine of the Free Flow of Information Between
the United States and Europe
1.

The Application of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights

Perhaps the oldest document that both the United States and
European nations have signed that expresses an intention to have
a free flow of information between the continents is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 4 0 However, the member states of
the United Nations did not consider this document binding on
them.2 4 ' Therefore, this document has a persuasive but not binding
effect on member states. Although not binding, the document does
provide a record of at least the broad intentions of member states
in their approach to human rights. This is relevant because the
International Covenant on Civil' and Political Rights,242 a more
binding document,243 uses almost the identical free speech language of Article 19 of the Declaration, and refers to the principles
of the Declaration. The analysis of the Declaration is useful, not
only for its own statement of member states intentions regarding
human rights, but also for guidance in interpreting the Covenant.
238. Up until very recently the Soviets saw communication as a good properly controlled by the state. See Leslie R. Strauss, Press Licensing Violates Freedom of Expression,
Compulsory Membership in an Associaiton Prescribedby Law for the Practice of Journalism, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 897 (1987). Also note the position the Third World has taken
concerning the freedom of press. See also Michael J. Farley, Conflicts Over Government
Control of Information-The United States and UNESCO, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1071 (1985).
239. Stephen Raube-Wilson, The New World Information and Communication Order
and International Human Rights Law, 9 BOSTON C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 107, 113

(1986)(citing L.
240.

OPPENHEIM, INT'L

L. 29 (8th Ed. 1955)).

G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)[hereinafter Declaration].

241. Raube-Wilson, supra note 239, at 116 (citing H. LAUTERPACHT, INT'L LAW &
HUMAN RIGHTS 397 (1968)). However, some commentators believe that the Universal Declaration does impose legal obligations on states party to the agreement "because it is an authoritative of the human rights guaranteed by the U.N. Charter (arts. 55,56)". Id. at 116
(citing Buergenthal, The Right to Receive Information Across National Boundaries, In
Control of the Direct Broadcast Satellite: Values in Conflict 73 (Aspen Institute Program
on Communications and Society 1974)). Conversely, if the Universal Declaration is an authoritative interpretation of a legally binding document, it would also legally binding itself.
However, it was intended not to be. Id. (citing LAUTERPACHT, supra at 408-409).
242. G.A. Res 2200, 21 U.N.G.A.0. R., Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 52
(1966) [hereinafter Covenant).
243. Id.
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The preamble to the Declaration brings out some basic purposes which the covenant attempts to implement. It states,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted
in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people, .. 244
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly
relations between nations, ....24.
Examination of the first statement reveals that freedom of speech
was given a high priority vis a vis the other rights enumerated. The
second statement illustrates an intention to construe the principles
articulated in the Articles consistent with creating a common understanding between peoples of various nations so as to develop
friendly relations between them.
In light of these purposes, the relevant article of the Declaration, Article 19 states
ARTICLE 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interand ideas
ference and to seek, receive and impart information
2 46
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
This statement indicates several characteristics concerning the international right to free expression. The right embodies the right
to impart information as well as receive it. The right applies "regardless of frontiers. 2 47 Considering the international context for
which the document was designed, this phrase means that the
right to impart and receive information applies regardless of national borders. It also applies to "any media." This phrase implies
that the right applies not only to the forms of media that were
dominant at the Article's drafting in 1948, but also to any other
forms of media which would become dominant in the future, such
as television.
The document also contains an exception:
ARTICLE 29
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
244.
245.
246.
247.

Declaration, supra note 240, at pmbl.
Id. 1 4.
Id.
Id.
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subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society. 4 '
In light of the high priority which the drafters gave to the right of
free expression, however, the limitations upon free speech referred
to should be construed narrowly.
Some writers have taken the view that Article 29 gives the
state "complete control over the granting and restricting of the
rights provided. '249 This view ignores the framework by which Article 29 grants individual states the power to put limitations upon
the rights enumerated in the Declaration. Article 29 allows limitations upon human rights by domestic law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare
250
in a democratic society.
This framework indicates that the state has the power to limit
human rights only when the limitation serves one of the above
mentioned purposes. State law may limit human rights only out of
"respect for the rights and freedoms of others"2' 5 1 or "[when] meeting the just requirements of morality, public order or the general
welfare in a democratic society .... ",51
In conclusion, the Declaration has recorded an intent by member states to give the freedom of expression a priority position vis a
vis other human rights enumerated. Additionally, any limitations
upon that right should be construed narrowly and will only be
valid where done for specified purposes. An important purpose of
these articles is to encourage an understanding between the peoples of member states so as to develop friendly relations. Finally,
the right to free expression includes the right both to receive and
impart information across national borders, and through any media which the speaker deems appropriate.
248. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art. 29. (1948).
249. Raube-Wilson, supra note 239, at 115.
250. Declaration, supra note 240, at art. 29.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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Application of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights

Most commentators agree that the main difference between
Article 19 of the Declaration and Article 19 of the Covenant isat
the latter is more binding.2 The preamble to the Covenant states:
[R]ecognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil
and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only
be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social
254
and cultural rights ....
The Covenant preamble incorporates the principles and purposes
of the Declaration into its own aims by recognizing the Declaration
and using language similar to that of the Declaration's preamble.
The Free Expression clause of the Covenant states,
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For the respect of the rights or reputations of
others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public
order or of public health or morals.

55

The threshold issue raised by the Article 19 is whether television is
a type of "media" to which the article applies. Article 19 addresses
253. The states that signed the Covenant agreed "to respect and to ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized in the present Covenant." Covenant, supra note 242, at
art 2. This statement indicates that the principles of the Covenant are legally binding principles. However, in order to gain the benefits of its implementation mechanism, both the
complaining party and the defendant must have made an optional declaration under art. Id.
Raube-Wilson, supra note 239, at 118. The United States and some European Nations have
not done so. Also note the that the United States has signed, but not ratified, the Covenant.
254. Covenant, supra note 252, at pmbl.
255. Id. at art. 19.
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this issue by stating that the "freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information" applies "either orally, in writing, or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice." 58 This
statement indicates that the right may be exercised through all
forms of media available. If the speaker chooses the television
broadcast the right applies in that context. The right also applies
to artistic expression as indicated by the statement that it applies
"in the form of art." Since Article 19 of the Declaration and the
Covenant require that the right applies to whatever media the
speaker chooses, and considering that Article 19 of the Covenant
applies to creative expression, the right applies to the television
broadcasts of fiction works.
As mentioned in the analysis of the Declaration, the right to
impart and receive information transcends national borders because the right applies "regardless of frontiers. 2 57 The question
then becomes how do these principles apply to the Directive. The
U.S. theory would be that the EC is interfering with the United
States' right to impart information. It is governmentally limiting
the amount of broadcasting that the United States can impart to
the citizens of the EC.
At first it may seem that the EC is not implementing content
regulation because it is not censoring American themes from the
broadcasts. However, the U.S. counter-argument would be that by
limiting U.S. origin work, the EC is conducting viewpoint discrimination. It is artificially excluding the expression of cultural information of a distinctly American flavor. It is theoretically possible
to imagine that European producers could produce television
about American themes. But common sense indicates that by having lived in the United States and experienced uniquely American
culture, American talent, producers, and writers would have a special viewpoint when it comes producing television. Their product
would reflect an American view of American culture. Therefore,
EC origin-based restrictions regulate content by governmentally
imposed viewpoint discrimination.
The EC might respond that this argument, although theoretically sound, does not comport to international custom. Many
states, including the United States regulate the content of their
broadcasting.
The United States has had a rich history of broadcast content
256.
257.

Id.
Id.
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regulation."' Many of these restrictions concerned indecency, 8 9
advertising for cigarettes,'" and lotteries.26 ' However, these restrictions differ from the Directive in that they seek to protect the
public from dangers to health and "morality" in the narrow sense
of the word. It could not be seriously argued that exposure to
American culture is a threat to fundamental moral precepts or encourages viewers to undertake fatal habits.
United States content restrictions have also gone beyond these
categories. As early as the Radio Act of 1927, the federal government required broadcasters to provide equal time to political candidates. Thus, a "broadcaster that carr[ied] the advertisements of
one political candidate [had] to give or sell equal time to opposing
candidates. 2 6 2 In 1934, the U.S. Congress gave the Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter FCC] the power to regulate
broadcasting according to "public necessity and convenience."26 3 In
1949, the FCC introduced the fairness doctrine.26 4 Under this approach, broadcasters were required to air issues that were "so critical or of such great public importance that it would be unreasonable for a licensee to ignore them completely. ' 26 5 In 1958, the FCC
generated two rules which flowed from the Fairness Doctrine. The
first rule was the personal attack rule. It required that where a
station broadcasted a program which attacked a person's character
during discussion of a controversial issue of public importance, the
station must inform the person and offer an opportunity to respond. 26 ' The second rule was the political editorializing rule. This
rule gives candidates the right to respond to editorials criticizing
them or favoring their opponents.2 67 It was in response to the personal attack rule that the United States Supreme Court handed
down its seminal case Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC.26 s In Red
Lion, the Court held that the personal attack rule violated the
258. Cate, supra note 2, at 397.
259. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988).
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988).
262. Cate, supra note 2, at 397 (citing Pub. L. No. 69-32, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927)).
263. See 47 U.S.C. § 155 (1982); Cate, supra note 2, at 397.
264. Id. at 398 (citing Editorializingby Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC 1246 (1949) (Report)). See Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, Syracuse, N.Y., 52 Fed.
Reg. 31,768 (1987) (the FCC ultimately found that the Fairness Doctrine violated the First
Amendment).
265. T. BARTON CARTER, ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT & THE FIFTH ESTATE: REG. OF
ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 59 (1986).
266. 47 C.F.R § 73.1920 (1987).
267. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1987).
268. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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First Amendment.
Finally, U.S. courts have upheld rules which mirror Article 4
of the Directive. A U.S. Court of Appeals has held that it was permissible for the FCC to consider a station's "local community orientation" and "responsiveness to community needs" in an evaluation to determine whether the license should be renewed.26 9 The
principle behind this rule parallels the one supporting the Directive. Hence, the Directive could be viewed simply as a "local content requirement" for EC members.
The EC could argue that a local content requirement is especially appropriate in the context of the EC. The EC has developed
into a quasi-political organization with political goals and aspirations.270 Members need information about one another to make informed decisions concerning community wide issues.
However, even if the EC does have political goals and EC
members need political information about one another, the Directive does not facilitate this process. This is best illustrated by comparing the application of the FCC local content rule to the application of the Directive. The application of the FCC local content rule
focuses on the need to give the local community political information, rather than culture. In Central Florida v. FCC, 271 the court
discussed the FCC's use of the local content rule. The Court
stated:
In this case ...the Commission (FCC) was painsiaking and explicit in its balancing. The Commission discussed in quite specific terms, for instance, the items it found impressive in Cowles'
past record. It stressed and listed numerous programs demonstrating Cowles' "local community orientation" and "responsiveness to community needs", discussed the percentage of Cowles'
272
programming devoted to news, public affairs, and local topics.
Based on the court's discussion, the local content factor constitutes
an evaluation of the amount of local political material which a
given station broadcasts. It evaluates the amount of time devoted
to "news, public affairs, and local topics," 273 and presumably favors
269. Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983). See also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(a)(8) (1989).
270. Some argue that under the Single European Act the purpose of the EEC is to
pursue the "strengthening of its [the EEC's] economic and social cohesion." Single European Act, supra note 4, at ch. II, art. 130(a). However, the issue of exactly how much individual sovereignty member states have given up to the Community is unresolved.
271. 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
272. Id. at 508.
273. Id.
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those broadcasters who devote a substantial amount of time to
those topics.27 4 In contrast, the Directive does not augment the dissemination of political material concerning local community issues." 5 Rather, the Directive's impact is to put a larger quantity of
European fiction work on European television. Showing more European soap operas vis a vis U.S. serials does not increase the sharing of various European states' political thoughts with one another.
The EC could respond that the Directive is consistent with a
state's responsibility to maintain some sense of national identity
and culture. The Directive does not totally exclude U.S. programming. Rather it simply limits non-EC programming to forty-nine
percent. The broadcasting spectrum is limited, and as such constitutes a limited resource. Therefore, the state has a duty to make
sure that a diversity of viewpoints, especially those originating
within its national borders, are be heard for the benefit of the public. The Supreme Court of the United States in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, recognized that
[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee....
It is the right of the public to receive to suitable access to social,
and other ideas and experiences
political, aesthetic, moral,
276
which is crucial here.
The Court also stated:
The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound
truck, or any other individual2 77does not embrace a right to snuff
out the free speech of others.
The EC can argue that it has a responsibility to encourage the
presentation of its own cultural viewpoint. The EC can buttress
this argument by pointing out that the right to cultural enjoyment
is protected in the Covenant. The preamble to the Covenant states:
[t]he ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and
political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id.
News is excluded from the calculation of the quota. Id.
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
Id. at 387.
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Article 1 of the Covenant states,
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.7 9
Moreover, there is an entire covenant, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights devoted to the right to
cultural development.2 80 The International Covenant states in its
relevant part:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life; ....
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the Covenant
to achieve full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of
science and culture ...
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and the development
of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and
cultural fields.281
Examining the text of Article 15, one cannot but notice the potential for conflict between on the one hand, Article 15 paragraph 2 of
International Covenant, the preamble and Article I of the Covenant and on the other hand, Article 15 paragraph 4 of the International Covenant. The preamble and Article 1 of the Covenant both
recognize the general right to cultural development. Article 15,
paragraph 2 of the International Covenant rights recognizes a state
right to take action to conserve culture. In contrast, paragraph 4 of
the same document recognizes the benefits to be derived from the
development of international contacts in cultural fields. Therefore,
although the right exists to impart information across borders for
the purpose of development of international contacts in cultural
fields as long as 'such contacts do not interfere with the conservation of domestic culture, it is difficult to determine where to draw
the line and how this standard applies to the Directive.
The issue may be approacted by determining whether U.S. tel278. Covenant, supra note 253.
279. Id. at art. 1.
280. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. G.A.O. Supp. (no.16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316) (1966) [hereinafter International Covenant].
281. Id. at art. 15.
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evision programs constitute a threat to European culture. Can reruns of Dallas do to French culture what a several year occupation
by Nazi Germany failed to do? That is, destroy it?2" 2 Moreover,
why is the Directive necessary now to preserve European Culture?
Europe has been inundated with U.S. television for close to forty
years. Has European Culture been destroyed by this exposure?
The EC could argue that the issue is a matter not only of retaining and developing member states cultures, but of developing a
pan-European culture. 2 3 Non-EC television broadcasts interfere
with this process by occupying the broadcast channels with United.
States and other foreign material. If this were true why would the
Directive's allowable forty-nine percent non-EC programming not
interfere with the process?
In conclusion, international agreements on free speech apply
to television broadcasts of fictional programs. Those agreements
prohibit content regulation through viewpoint discrimination. The
United States may argue that U.S. regulation of its own broadcasting differs from the Directive because U.S. regulation augments the
democratic process, whereas the Directive does not. It can even be
argued that the Directive does not enrich pan-European culture,
but rather the pan-European broadcasting industry. However, the
ultimate problem is that the right to cultural conservation directly
conflicts with the freedom to impart information across national
borders. Information and viewpoints of other cultures by their very
nature affect the culture and the nations upon which they are imparted. It is perhaps upon this tenet which paragraph 4 of Article
15 was based. The "benefits" that states derive from "international
contact and cooperation" in the "field of culture" are a greater understanding of each other. But, such interchange alters the relationship between one's own culture and others. By being exposed
to another culture, that other culture becomes less foreign and
consequently, cultural stereotypes dissipate. The very exposure to
another culture results in the assimilation of that other culture
into one's own. As this process occurs the differences between the
two original cultures are reduced. To the extent that cultural differences equal cultural identities, exposure to other cultures leads
to the loss of an originally pure cultural identity.
This process, however, fulfills one of the basic purposes of the
282. See Jack Valenti, The European Community Makes Ominous Sounds About
Broadcast Quotas (remarks to the Advisory Comm. on Int'l Comm. and Info. Pol'y, Dep't of
State, Wash., D.C., 3, July 17, 1989).
283. Green Paper,supra note 49, at 28.
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UN documents, to "promote the development of friendly relations
between nations."'2 84 Once people understand other cultures, the
chance for misunderstanding, hatred, and international political
tension is lessened.
3.

Application of the Helsinki Accords

The Helsinki Accords,28 5 which both Europe and the United
States signed, 28 6 support the view that it is only through constant
and mutual exchange of cultural information that friendly relations among nations and stability in the world can be maintained.
The preamble states,
Reaffirming their objective of promoting better relations among
themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can
live a true and lasting peace free from any threat or attempt
against their security ...
Mindful of their common history and recognizing that the
existence of elements common to their traditions and values can
assist them in developing their relations, and desiring to search,
fully taking into account the individuality and diversity of their
positions and views, for possibilities of joining their efforts with
a view to overcoming distrust and increasing confidence, solving
the problems that separate them and co-operating in the interest of mankind .... 287

The relevant part of the text then states,
2. Information
The participating States,
Conscious of the need for an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating
States,
Acknowledging the contribution of this process to the
growth of confidence between peoples,
Desiring, with the development of mutual understanding
284. Declaration, supra note 240, at preamble, 4.
285. Final Act Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 73
Dep't State Bull. 323 (1975); reprinted in 14 Int'l Legal Mat. 1292 (1975) and Appendix A
[hereinafter Final Act].
286. The binding nature of the Final Act is a complex question which remains open to
debate. See Alexandre Charles Kiss & Mary Frances Dominick, The InternationalLegal
Significance of the Human Rights Provisionsof the Helsinki FinalAct, 13 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 293 (1980). However, the Final Act "has entered the discourse of international
human rights as if it were equivalent in legal effect to the International Covenants." HENTRY
STEINER & DETLEv VAGTS, TRANSNAT'L LEGAL PROBs.

287.

462 (1986).

Final Act, supra note 287, at pmbl.
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between the participating States and with the further improvement of their relations, to continue further efforts towards progress in this field,
Recognizing the importance of the dissemination of information from the other participating States and a better acquaintance with such information...
Emphasizing therefore the essential and influential role of the
press, radio, television, cinema, news agencies and of the journalists working in these fields,
Make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage co-operation in
the field of information and the exchange of information with
other countries, and improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in
another participating State,
Express their intention in particular:
(iii) Filmed and Broadcast Information
- To promote the improvement of the dissemination of filmed
and broadcast information. To this end:
they will encourage a wider showing of broadcasting of a greater
variety of recorded and filmed information from other participating States, illustrating the various aspects of life in their
countries . ..;
they will facilitate the import by competent organizations and
films of recorded audio-visual material from other participating
states.""
The Europeans could make several responses to the use of the
Final Act to attack the validity of the Directive. They could argue
that the problem the Final Act intended to solve was the tension
between the Soviet Bloc and the West, 8 9 not a United States West European problem. They could also point out that the Final
Act requires that they "encourage a greater variety of recorded and
filmed information from other participating states."2' 9 0 The Directive facilitates that process by requiring that non-EC material, especially United States material, does not dominate European television. By requiring that fifty-one percent of television
programming be EC, the Directive facilitates a wider showing of
European material between European states.
Although the context within which the Final Act was written
may have been detente, that does not detract from the fact that
288.
289.
290.

Id. at Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields (Basket II) Information.
See generally VAGTS & STINER, supra note 288, at 461.
See Final Act, supra note 287.
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it has become an international norm in the field of human rights.291
Moreover, the fact that it was written in an attempt to facilitate
detente has other implications. Informational exchange between
states was seen as an important method to breaking down distrust
between the populations of the East and West. If the use of cultural exchange through television and other media breaks down
mistrust, the inverse could be true. If nations create blockages to
the free flow of information, they run the risk of creating mistrust.
Although there clearly is no danger of war between the United
States and the EC, the free flow of information between nations is
a necessary underpinning to ensuring that relations between nations remain friendly and stable. This is not the type of rule which
can be applied haphazardly, especially forcefully during times of
international tension and more lightly during times of friendly coexistence. The purpose of the rule is prophylactic, to create and
maintain a stable sense of peace and mutual understanding in the
world.
The thorny question of allocation of broadcast resources remains. Even if all the arguments are true concerning the importance of the free flow of information, the issue becomes not
whether it should exist, but who decides how it is allocated. The
United States could argue that it is bad precedent for states to
take it upon themselves to decide which cultures should have "priority exposure." For the sake of preservation of power, governments will only expose their populations to cultures which they
favor. Based on human nature these "favored cultures" are likely
to be cultures similar to those of the regulating state. Thus, once
states get in the business of deciding which cultures should have
priority exposure, there will ultimately be cultural stagnation and
isolationism. A basis for free expression is a market place of ideas
theory. In this theory political and cultural truths are only arrived
at by allowing them to compete for the majority's acceptance
through various forms of expression. This marketplace can only
function efficiently if the government; remains clear of the process.
Of course, the Red Lion principle that the government has a
duty to ensure that a diversity of viewpoints are aired must be
respected. 9 2 However, there is no evidence that Europeans have
not been exposed to television from other European states. The
economic reality in Europe is that entertainment shows originating
in one European country rarely have much popularity in other Eu291.
292.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 278-79.
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ropean States. 93 It is not that EC states have not had exposure to
each other's broadcasts but rather that the receiving public has
chosen not to watch them.
The Helsinki Accords establish a international norm among its
signatories that the mutual unfettered exchange of information is
necessary to maintain friendly relationships between nations. The
process by which a given nation allocates the inflow of information
from other states must be dictated by its viewers not its government, as long as a diversity of viewpoints have been exposed. If a
state's government decides which culture should have "priority exposure" it will choose the most similar to its own so as to hold onto
political power. If citizens are unable to choose from among the
international marketplace of ideas, they will lose opportunities for
choosing the best political and cultural path for themselves. Those
nations-in the recent past the Eastern Bloc-in which the governments have dictated which political systems and cultures are
exposed to their populations, and to what degree that exposure occurs, are now only starting to realize the cultural and political enrichment that they have missed. This issue also has an impact on
international relations. The unfettered free flow of information between states is not a principle which can be applied haphazardly.
The purpose of the rule is prophylactic, to maintain a constant
tenor of international stability and peaceful coexistence. If one
waits until tensions erupt to invoke the rule, it may be too late.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Directive impacts international obligations both in the areas of free trade and the free flow of information. In the area of
free trade area, the United States has a strong argument that the
Directive violates Article III of GATT, and the OECD Code of Liberalization of Invisible Operations. In the area of the international
free flow of information the U.S. argument is more tenuous. The
United States can argue that the Directive violates its right to impart information to Europe based on various international human
rights documents. However, this argument open the U.S. position
to attack because of its own judicial and legislative willingness to
impose content restrictions similar to the Directive. The United
States can attempt to make distinctions between its own laws and
that of the Directive by showing that economic, instead of political
goals are furthered by the Directive. The facilitation of the politi293.

Telephone Interview with Kathy Goodman & James Primm, supra note 39.
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cal process whether within the United States or the EC is the only
legitimate foundation upon which to base content regulation. Since
U.S. legislation accomplishes this goal, and the Directive does not,
U.S. legislation may. be distinguished from the Directive.
However, the strongest U.S. argument in the free speech area
is reminding the Europeans of the underlying goals which are the
basis for many of the international agreements on free speech as
well as free trade: the long term maintenance of stable and friendly
international relations. The United States can argue that cumulatively the obligations embodied in GATT, the OECD, and international human rights documents represent the result of an international consensus on more than just their particular issues. Those
leaders that emerged from the horrors of World War II recognized
fundamental truths about the nature of exchanges whether, economic or cultural between different states. Free exchange of both
material and information between peoples creates material, cultural, and political enrichment for those nations participating, and
soothes international tension by reducing inequality and prejudice.
As people understand the mutual values and traditions that they
share, they are less likely to generate the mistrust and prejudices
necessary to fight.
Free trade and the free flow of information go hand in hand.
The very European states that created the Directive recognize this
truth.- They enacted the Directive to create a free flow of information in Europe as response to the Single European Act's mandate
to create a free flow of trade in Europe.2 94 Those states recognized
the importance of the free exchange of information in the context
of the European Community. They hope to create a Pan-European
culture where petty national differences which have plagued the
continent in the form of mistrust, prejudice and even wars, will
dissipate so that they can cooperate in an unfettered movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital. The Directive is a means to
engender that result. European States, by recognizing the need to
liberalize the free of flow information for the purpose of creating
lasting trading relationships between states, have recognized the
fundamental link between free trade; the free flow of information,
mutual understanding, cooperation and peace.
The EC, on the one hand, recognizing the need to create a free
flow of information and trade in Europe, while on the other hand,
erecting trade and information barriers between Europe and the
294.

Green Paper, supra note 49, at 24.
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rest of the World is behaving inconsistently. The former may sooth
tensions between European states, but the later unnecessarily creates tension between Europe and the rest of the World.
Perhaps the debate over the Directive is a test of an international commitment to avoid regression to the "beggar-my-neighbor" policies of pre World War II, and to sustain the human right
of free expression which occasionally blossoms and withers in the
course of world history. One hopes that the result of the test will
reaffirm these commitments instead of rejecting them. If states
take a loose interpretation of these commitments, applying them
haphazardly, they become weak. The nature of these commitments
requires that when serious international tension arises, and a crisis
comes to ahead, they be strong. At that point, the only means to
turn to resolve the crisis besides arms, are past relationships, not
just between leaders of the states but between their peoples, built
through a history of political, cultural, and economic exchange.
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